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T his article sets out to empirically determine whether the ratio 
between debt and gross domestic product (gdp) affected real and nominal 
variables such as the demand for money, the nominal interest rate, 
investment and the output gap, between January 1995 and March 2008. 
The specific aim is to identify fiscal-policy transmission channels and decide 
whether this policy was active or passive in the period in question. The 
study finds empirical evidence that fiscal policy was active and monetary 
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Given the nominal deficits recorded in recent decades, 
since 1999 the Brazilian authorities have adopted an 
inflation-targeting regime in a context of fiscal imbalance. 
Despite the successive primary surpluses achieved 
in recent years and relative stability in the debt/gdp 
ratio, the country’s fiscal situation remains worrying, 
particularly in view of the rising trend of the debt/gdp 
ratio since the recent global financial crisis (subprime 
mortgage crisis). In 2009, federal tax revenue fell by 
3.05% in real terms, while gdp declined by 0.2%. At the 
same time, the Union’s expenses increased by 12.51% 
on the 2008 figure, and its net debt grew from 23.44% 
of gdp in 2008 to 28.88% in 2009.1
The high interest rates maintained by the Central 
Bank of Brazil to achieve its inflation targets contributed 
to the fact that debt service exceeded the primary surplus. 
Despite the drop in the Special Settlement and Custody 
System (selic) rate in 2009, Brazil still has one of the 
highest real interest rates in the world. Constant growth 
of the nominal deficit and, consequently, public debt, 
compounded by large short-term liabilities and high 
interest rates, make the fiscal deficit very worrying.2
The argument that Brazilian fiscal policy affects 
monetary policy to some extent seems to have foundation 
and is supported by some economists. It therefore seems 
sensible to consider fiscal variables when formulating an 
optimal monetary policy model for the central bank.
Nonetheless, using fiscal variables in the optimal 
monetary policy rule would mean admitting that the 
fiscal policy implemented in the Brazilian economy 
constrains the results and scope of monetary policy, 
thereby rendering it relatively or wholly ineffective. 
Assuming that the Central Bank of Brazil has to take 
account of the fiscal constraint in its monetary policy 
rule, implies admitting that monetary policy is not active 
or that fiscal policy is not passive, or both.
Generally speaking, optimal monetary policy 
models take fiscal policy as given and independent of 
1  Data obtained from the government accounts audit for fiscal 2009 
performed by the Federal Audit Department (Tribunal de Contas 
da União). 
2  Souza, Moreira and Albuquerque (2007) analyse the long-term 
solvency of Brazil’s public debt from January 1995 to July 2004, 
and show that this is not solvent unless seignorage is included as a 
source of income.
current and future monetary policy. This means that the 
fiscal policy authority chooses a tax rate to ensure that 
public debt is inter-temporally solvent.3 The Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis is valid and, in that framework, 
monetary policy is active and fiscal policy passive. In 
situations of fiscal dominance, monetary policy will be 
passive and fiscal policy active.
According to Leeper (1991), the distinction between 
active and passive policy is based on the fact that the 
former takes into consideration not only the prior or 
current behaviour of certain variables (passive policy), 
but also the expected behaviour of certain variables in a 
given future period. An active policy is not constrained 
by current conditions, but makes it possible to formulate 
a decision rule that depends on past, current and future 
variables. A passive fiscal or monetary policy or authority 
is constrained by consumer optimizing conditions and 
the actions of the active authority. For example, if fiscal 
policy is passive, the fiscal authority’s decision rule will 
necessarily depend on prior or current public debt.
Blanchard (2004) argues that discussion of the 
dominance of fiscal over monetary policy is not new, 
but spans from the modern literature of Sargent and 
Wallace (1981), as exemplified by “Some unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic”, to the fiscal theory of the price 
level (ftpl) propounded by Woodford (2003).4 In that 
regard, there has been renewed interest in the discussion 
on coordination and interaction between monetary and 
fiscal policies. 
The main point of the ftpl line of research is that 
the present value of the government’s budget constraint 
and fiscal policy are key factors in determining the 
price level.5 
That argument stands in contrast to the traditional 
theory of price determination, in which the money 
supply, and hence the monetary authority, is the only 
factor determining the price level. Moreover, fiscal 
policy, either explicitly or implicitly, adjusts the primary
3  This broadly means that fiscal policy is passive.
4  See the papers by Loyo (1999) on an application of Woodford’s 
theory to the case of Brazil, and Sala (2004) on the fiscal theory of 
the price level. 
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surplus passively to guarantee the government’s solvency 
irrespective of the price level.
The main purpose of this article is to use non-
Ricardian models to empirically determine whether 
fiscal policies had effects on real and nominal variables 
such as the demand for money, the nominal interest rate, 
investment and the output gap in the period running from 
January 1995 to March 2008. Its specific purpose is to 
evaluate the effects of the debt/gdp ratio on all of the 
variables mentioned, identify the channels through which 
fiscal policy is transmitted and decide whether fiscal 
policy was active or passive in the period analysed. 
II 
Methodological issues
The variables and the respective nomenclature used in 
this article (in parentheses) are as follows: Means of 
payment (M); Nominal gdp (Y); Nominal interest rate - 
percentage (R); Investment or gross fixed capital formation 
(I); Implicit gdp deflator (P); Nominal exchange rate 
(E); Real effective exchange rate (e); Primary surplus 
(SP); Inflation rate (π). The Federal government’s direct 
income, in other words direct taxes (DT), is obtained 
from the sum of personal and corporate income taxes 
and the rural property tax. Federal public bonds and 
open-market operations (B) were used as a proxy for 
the public debt. A dummy variable was also used to 
distinguish the period of managed exchange rates (January 
1995 to April 1998) from the “flexible” exchange-rate 
regime in the following period. Annex table A.8 gives 
details of the variables used and specifies the sources 
and units of measurement. 
Real gdp was calculated on the basis of the implicit 
gdp deflator. To calculate the output gap (y) the Hodrick-
Prescott filter was used, which is defined as the difference 
between real gdp and potential gdp (trend). A positive 
value indicates excess demand. The extended national 
consumer price index (ipca)6 was used to calculate the 
real interest rate (r). In all the estimations, the variables 
were expressed as logarithms.
The time-series models are estimated in detail 
in section III. Johansen co-integration7 and unit root 
tests were used in addition to simultaneous equation 
models —the generalized method of moments with 
instrumental variables. An analysis was made of the
6  The real interest rate was calculated in the traditional way: (1 + Rt) 
= (1 + rt) * [1 + Et(πt+1)], assuming that Et(πt+1) = πt+1. 
7  The optimal number of lags was chosen on the basis of the 
following criteria: Modified sequential likelihood ratio test (lr);
long-term equations arising from the co-integration 
tests, particularly to establish whether the public debt 
is significant and whether it has the expected sign in 
accordance with the theoretical model as presented. 
Other standard time-series techniques, such as weak 
exogeneity tests, were also used. 
It should be noted that use of the generalized 
method of moments is appropriate when the regressors 
and error term are correlated, in which case instrumental 
variables should be used which are not correlated with 
the residuals, but are correlated with the regressors. The 
need to add instruments to estimate the coefficients creates 
an “over -identification” problem; and the J-statistic test 
was used to verify the existence of that problem. The 
null hypothesis is that the over-identification constraints 
are satisfied. The instruments are also used to resolve 
endogeneity problems.
When the variables are not stationary specific 
problems are known to arise in conventional inference 
procedures based on ordinary least squares (ols) 
regressions. Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p. 317) stress 
the importance of knowing whether similar problems 
occur in the context of two-stage ols regressions when 
faced with those difficulties. Hsiao (1997a and 1997b) 
analyse that problem and conclude that inference with 
two-stage least squares estimators using instrumental 
variables remains valid, even in the case of non-stationary 
or non-co-integrated series. In that context, Hsiao’s 
conclusions also hold when the generalized method of 
moments is applied. 
Final prediction error (efp); Akaike information criterion (aic); 
Schwarz information criterion; Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
(hq). In cases where these indicators selected different lags, the most 
moderate model was chosen, in other words the model that indicated 
the smallest number of lags.
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This section presents empirical data from fiscal 
sustainability tests and estimations of various theoretical 
models that relate the effect of certain fiscal variables 
on nominal and real variables in the economy. The 
following subsection considers the effect of the public 
debt on the demand for money.
1. Effects of the public debt on the demand for 
money
Kneebone (1989) defines the real demand for money 
as a negative function of the nominal interest rate and 
a positive function of output and real wealth.8 Net real 
wealth is defined as:
 W = M / P + β(B / P)] (1)
where W is the net real wealth of private agents; β is 
the fraction of government bonds that private agents 
perceive as net wealth (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) and B is the nominal 
value of government bonds outstanding. Moreover, if 
Y/P represents real output, R is the nominal interest rate; 
P is the price level, and M is a nominal money supply, 
then the real demand for money is given by
 M / P = L1(Y / P + L 2R + L3[M / P + β(B / P)]  (2)
According to Kneebone (1989), normalizing 
equation (2), by Y/P gives 
 m = L1 + L 2R + L3(m - β b) (3)
where L1 > 0, L 2 < 0 and L3 > 0; m = M / Y; b = B / Y. 
Equation (3) can also be written as
 m = (L1/1 - L3) + (L 2/1 - L3)R + β(L3/1 - L3)b (4)
8  Scarth (1996) works with a similar approach for the real demand 
for money in a non-Ricardian equivalence setting.
A stochastic equation is then defined from equation 
(4), such that 
 mt = β0 + β1Rt + β2bt + ηt  (5)
where β0 = (L1/1 - L3); β1 = (L 2/1 - L3) and 
β2 = (L3/1 - L3). If β2 is statistically equal to zero, then 
the hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence is imposed. 
Table A.1 in the annex shows that m, b, and R are 
not stationary. As can be seen in annex tables A.4 and 
A.5, the Johansen co-integration tests indicate a co-
integration equation with a 5% significance level. The 
model as presented also used a dummy variable, as an 
exogenous variable in the vector autoregression model 
(var).9 The long-term equation states that 
 mt = 1.632 - 0.534Rt + 0.438bt (6)
 (0.125) (0.089) (0.162)
The figures in parentheses represent the standard 
deviations of the respective estimated coefficients. The 
long-term equation shows that for every 1% increase 
in the debt/gdp ratio, there is an increase of 0.438% 
in the demand for money. There is a positive Pearson 
correlation of 94.2% between those two variables at a 1% 
significance level. Based on the Chi-squared distribution, 
which has a value of 3.869, the null hypothesis of weak 
endogeneity of the debt/gdp ratio is rejected (probability 
value = 0.049). 
As expected, there is a negative relation between 
the interest rate and the demand for money. Every 1% 
increase in the selic rate generates a 0.534% reduction 
in the demand for money.
— Fiscal sustainability test and effects of the public 
debt on the demand for money
Luporini (2006) provides a good review and analysis 
of the various ways of testing fiscal sustainability that 
have been published in the literature. The present paper 
9  On the basis of the Schwarz criterion (sic), four lags were chosen. 
III
Presentation of non-ricardian models 
and their results
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specifically uses the Buiter and Patel (1992) approach, 
which is also described by Luporini (2006). 
Based on the article by Wilcox (1989), Buiter and 
Patel (1992) propose a robust solvency criterion which, 
in addition to the stationary nature of the debt, assumes 
that the latter cannot display a positive, stochastic, or 
deterministic trend. The test consists of estimating the 
following equation





∑α α β ε0 1
1
t i+ +  (7)
where B is the public debt, trend is the trend term, 
and ε is the stochastic term. According to Buiter and 
Patel (1992), insolvency can occur if at least one of the 
following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) The roots of 1 - β(L) are not all outside the unit 
circle, in other words, the differential equation is 
not stable;
(ii) There is a deterministic trend, such that α1 ≠ 0 and 
the coefficient may be positive;
(iii) The expected mean is not zero, in other words, 
α0 ≠ 0 , so the process governing the debt may be 
stationary, but its expected mean is not zero. 
Also according to Buiter and Patel (1992), where
 B trend B t= + −α α0 1 1t tβ ε+ +  (8)
the null hypothesis of insolvency is given by β1 = 1 and 
α1 = 0. In this context, it can be seen that:
(i) If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the discounted 
debt is not stationary, fiscal policy is unsustainable, 
and, if the situation persists indefinitely, insolvency 
will result;
(ii) If the null hypothesis is rejected but there is a 
positive deterministic trend, fiscal policy is relatively 
unsustainable because the insolvency problem will 
eventually arise;
(iii) If the null hypothesis is rejected and it is not possible 
to reject β1 < 1 and α1 = 0, if there is a positive 
means such that α0 > 0, the situation once again 
will eventually lead to insolvency.
Buiter and Patel (1992) extend (generalize) the 
Wilcox (1989) statistical model, using techniques 
developed by Phillips and Perron (1988). Those authors 
show that α0 < 0 and α0 = 0 are conditions that are 
consistent with the situations of solid solvency and 
solvency, respectively. Consequently, if α0 > 0, the 
value of the discounted debt is positive. In that context, 
conditions for repaying the present value of the debt out 
of current and future primary surplus, or current and 
future seignorage, do not exist.
Equation (8) can be normalized through output, 
such that 
 b trend b dummy t= + + + +−α α β α ε0 1 1 2t t  (9)
where the dummy variable is introduced. It is thus 
possible to estimate equations (9) and (5) as a system 
using the generalized method of moments. 
The results shown in table 1 indicate that all variables, 
except the constant and trend terms, are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Based on the Wald test, the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, where the null hypothesis 
(Ho) is expressed as: β1 = 1 and α1 = 0, the value of 
the Chi-squared distribution is 1.4286 and the P value 
is 0.4895. In that context, as the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, fiscal policy is unsustainable, and if the situation 
persists indefinitely it will lead to insolvency. 
The generalized method of moments with the 
Bartlett kernel, applied in conjunction with the two 
equations taken as a system, produces the statistics 
shown in tables 1 and 2. The model specification is 
tested through the J-statistic linked to over-identification 
constraints. The J-statistic of 0.27, together with a P 
value of 0.975, do not provide evidence to reject the 
model specification.
TABLE 1
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(bt = α0 + α1trend + βbt-1 + α2dummy + εt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-statistic P value
Constant 1.62*10-6 0.0079 0.0002 0.9998
Trend -0.0002 0.0003 -0.6881 0.4931
Debt/gdp(-1) 1.0269 0.0243 42.3339 <0.0001
Dummy 0.0719 0.0107 6.6889 <0.0001
R2 0.9769 Adjusted R2 0.9754
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments b(-3,-4,-5,-6), m(-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-3,-4,-5,-6), 
constant.
gdp: Gross domestic product
Trend: Trend
Dummy: Dummy variable
P value: Probability 
The results shown in table 2 indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients have the expected signs, such that for every 
1% rise in the interest rate there is a 0.033% reduction 
in demand for money; and for every 1% increase in the 
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debt/gdp ratio, there is a 0.082% increase in the demand 
for money. This shows that economic agents view part 
of the public debt as net wealth, so the model is non-
Ricardian. These results agree with those of equation (6) 
in terms of the significance and signs of the estimated 
coefficients. 
The result shown in tables 1 and 2 are consistent and 
provide empirical evidence that, in the period analysed, 
Brazil had an unsustainable fiscal policy corresponding 
to a non-Ricardian model.
2. Effects of the public debt on the primary 
surplus
Bohn (1998) attempts to evaluate the sustainability of 
fiscal policy based on the response of the primary surplus 
to changes in the debt/gdp ratio. This relation is simplified 
through a regression of a following type:
 
 SP/Y = 0.004 + 0.031*B/Y (10)
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Table A.1 of the annex shows that both variables 
are first-order integrated I(1), and table A.2 shows co-
integration at a 5% significance level. The figures in 
parentheses represent the standard deviations of the 
respective estimated coefficients. The long-term equation 
shows that for every 1% increase in the debt/gdp ratio 
there is a 0.031% increase in the primary surplus/gdp 
ratio.10 The positive Pearson correlation between the two 
variables is 74.7% at the 5% significance level. It should 
also be noted that, based on the Chi-squared distribution, 
which has a value of 1.168, the null hypothesis of weak 
endogeneity (probability = 0.279) is not rejected; in other 
words, the debt/gdp ratio is weakly exogenous. 
— Fiscal sustainability test and the effects of the public 
debt on the primary surplus
The results shown in table 3 indicate that all 
variables, except for the constant and trend terms, are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In that context, 
as the null hypothesis is not rejected, fiscal policy is 
unsustainable, and if the situation persists indefinitely 
it will lead to insolvency. 
The J-statistic of 0.274, together with a P value 
of 0.90, do not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
TABLE 3
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(bt = α0 + α1trend + βbt-1 + α2dummy + εt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student  
t- Statistic P value
Constant 0.0009 0.0086 0.1105 0.9122
Trend -2.80*10-5 0.0003 -0.0799 0.9365
Debt/gdp(-1) 1.0123 0.0201 50.3442 <0.0001
Dummy 0.0691 0.0086 8.0382 <0.0001
R2 0.9815 Adjusted R2 0.9803
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments b(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), sp(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4, 
-5,-6), constant.
gdp: Gross domestic product
Trend: Trend
Dummy: Dummy variable
P value: Probability 
The results shown in table 4 indicate that all variables 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients 
have the expected signs, such that for every 1% increase 
10  Based on the Schwarz (sic) and Hannan-Quinn (hq) information 
criteria, one lag was chosen.
TABLE 2
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(mt = β0 + β1Rt + β2bt ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.1637 0.0027 60.9467 <0.001
selic -0.0335 0.0041 -8.1930 <0.001
Debt/gdp 0.0818 0.0030 27.0272 <0.001
R2 0.8616  Adjusted R2 0.8556
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments b(-3,-4,-5,-6), m(-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-3,-4,-5,-6), 
constant.
gdp: Gross domestic product
selic: Special settlement and custody system rate
P value: Probability
193
bRAzIL: An EmPIRICAL sTudy on FIsCAL PoLICy TRAnsmIssIon  •  TITo bELChIoR sILVA moREIRA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 1
in the primary surplus cause a reduction in the monetary 
base, once again ceteris paribus, the interest rate will 
rise. Although it is well known that the money supply 
is endogenous in an inflation-targeting regime (because 
the central bank Brazil controls the selic rate), this is 
merely an intuitive exercise to evaluate the direction of 
interest-rate movements in response to an increase in 
the public debt. 
4. Effects of the public debt on the interest rate
— Fiscal sustainability test and effects of the public 
debt on the interest rate
Martins (1980) develops a theory of the determination 
of nominal income and the interest rate based on the 
hypothesis that economic agents can, at different times, 
hold government bonds and money in their portfolio. 
Agents take account of the government’s budget constraint, 
and are not concerned about the future discount rate on 
liabilities stemming from the issuance of government 
bonds. Under that theory, the price of bonds is analogous 
to the price level. Moreover, the nominal interest rate 
is determined by the relation between the amounts of 
government bonds and money, and has no relation with 
the rate of increase in the price level. That result assumes 
that the Fisher theory (Fisher, 1930, chapters. 2 and 19) 
on the nominal interest rate is not maintained. Moreira 
and Souza (2009) test the Martins (1980) model and, on 
the basis of panel data for the period 1980-2006, show 
that the ratio between the public debt and the monetary 
aggregate M1 affects the nominal interest rate. 
In keeping with the Martins (1980) model, the 
fundamental equation can be written as Rt = Bt / Mt, where 
Rt = (1 + it), t represents time, i represents the nominal 
interest rate, B is the amount of government bonds, and 
M the money supply, measured as M1. Expressing both 
sides of the equation as logarithms, and representing it 
in stochastic form gives:
 log(Rt) = log(Bt) - log(M1t) + et (11)
This section estimates two systems to evaluate the 
effects of the public debt on the interest rate (selic). The 
objective of the first consists of evaluating the direct 
effect according to data presented in tables 5 and 6, 
whereas the aim of the second is to evaluate the indirect 
effect of the public debt on the interest rate through the 
primary surplus, as shown in tables 7, 8, and 9. The 
direct effect of the primary surplus on the interest rate 
is thus also tested. 
in the debt/gdp ratio, there is a 0.03% increase in the 
primary surplus/gdp ratio, which means that the primary 
surplus reacts to variations in the public debt. 
TABLE 4
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(spt = β0 + β1bt + ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.0049 0.0006 7.6443 <0.0001
Debt/gdp 0.0305 0.0014 21.7183 <0.0001
R2 0.6151 Adjusted R2 0.6070
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments b(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), sp(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4, 
-5,-6), constant.
gdp: Gross domestic product
P value: Probability 
3. Brief remarks on the relation between the 
primary surplus, the single national treasury 
account, and the monetary base
It is worth noting that the federal government’s primary 
surplus is recorded in the single account of the National 
Treasury, which in turn forms part of the nonmonetary 
liability of the central bank. As the variation in the 
monetary base corresponds to the difference between 
the variation in central bank’s assets and the variation 
in its nonmonetary liabilities, an increase in the primary 
surplus (and hence in the National Treasury single 
account recorded in the non-monetary liability), with 
everything else held constant, means the monetary base 
will shrink. In that context, successive increases in the 
primary surplus will lead to a contraction in the monetary 
base ceteris paribus, and consequently a reduction in 
means of payment. This institutional structure reveals 
the existence of a direct transmission channel from 
fiscal policy to monetary policy. In conjunction with 
this, if the public debt which responds to variations in 
the primary surplus positively affects the demand for 
money, both the public debt and the primary surplus can 
be expected to have repercussions on the interest rate. 
But, in which direction? 
If the interest rate is determined by the supply and 
demand for money, and if the latter responds positively 
to variations in the public debt, for a given money supply, 
the interest rate will rise. Secondly, knowing that increases 
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The results shown in table 5 indicate that all variables, 
except the trend term, are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In that situation, as the null hypothesis is rejected 
but there is a positive deterministic trend, fiscal policy 
is relatively unsustainable, and the insolvency problem 
will eventually arise.
The J-statistic of 0.22 and a P value of 0.99 do not 
provide evidence to reject the model specification. 
The results shown in table 6 indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient on the public debt shows that for every 
1% increase in the debt the interest rate rises by 0.02%. 
This means that government debt has a positive and 
significant effect on the interest rate, suggesting a 
non-Ricardian model and an active fiscal policy. It also 
shows that when the government increases liquidity in 
TABLE 5
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(Bt = α0 + α1trend + βBt-1 + α2dummy + εt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 1.9346 0.6172 3.1344 0.0023
Trend 0.0033 0.0019 1.7091 0.0908
Debt (-1) 0.8522 0.0499 17.0591 <0.0001
Dummy -0.1051 0.0409 -2.5648 0.0120
R2 0.9957 Adjusted R2 0.9954
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), constant.
Trend: Trend
Dummy: Dummy variable
P value: Probability 
TABLE 6
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(Rt = β0 + β1Bt + β2M1t ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.0553 0.0097 5.6843 <0.0001
Debt 0.0245 0.0067  3.6683  0.0004
M1 0.0325 0.0073  4.4298 <0.0001
R2 0.1225 Adjusted R2 0.0843
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), constant.
M1: Means of payment
P value: Probability
TABLE 7
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(Bt = α0 + α1trend + βBt-1 + α2dummy + εt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 1.7303 0.1425 12.1408 <0.0001
Trend 0.0025 0.0004 6.1506 <0.0001
Debt (-1) 0.8691 0.0115 75.2616 <0.0001
Dummy -0.1086 0.0048 -22.4522 <0.0001
R2 0.9955 Adjusted R2 0.9952
Source: prepared by the author.




P value: Probability 
TABLE 8
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(spt = β0 + β1Bt + ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant -2.1326 0.0656 -32.4982 <0.0001
Debt 0.8566 0.0048 177.7032 <0.0001
R2 0.6431 Adjusted R2 0.6355
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), SP(-2,-3,-4, 
-5,-6), constant.
P value: Probability 
TABLE 9
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(Rt = β0 + β1SPt - β2M1t ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.0778 0.0009 78.0522 <0.0001
SP 0.0011 0.0001 6.8915 <0.0001
M1 0.0065 0.0002 32.9243 <0.0001
R2 0.5067 Adjusted R2 0.4852
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), SP(-2,-3,-4, 
-5,-6), constant.
SP: Primary surplus.
M1: Means of payment 
P value: Probability
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where Kt is the capital stock at the start of period t, Bt 
is the amount of government bonds at the start of t, A 
represents technology and the coefficient δ indicates 
agents’ preferences. Equation (12) shows that the rate 
of growth of the capital stock is endogenous. In that 
context, the flow of debt financing as a proportion of the 
capital stock in the previous period negatively affects the 
capital accumulation rate. This is due to a crowding-out 
effect in which productive investment is reduced as a 
result of an increase in public debt.11 
As investment is the difference between the capital 
stock at times t and t-1 (in other words Kt - Kt-1 = It), 
and that Yt-1 = AKt-1, equation (12) can be rewritten 
as follows: 
 It / Yt-1 = β0 + β1 *(Bt / Yt-1) (13)
where β0 = (δ A - 1) / A(1+ δ) and β1 = -1/[(1 + A)(1 + δ)].
Having established this, the equation is estimated 
as follows:
 It / Yt-1 = β0 + β1 *(Bt / Yt-1) + ut (14)
where the parameter β1 shows the relation between 
the ratios debt (t)/gdp (t-1) and investment (t)/nominal 
gdp (t-1), β0 is the intercept parameter, and ut is the 
(stochastic) error term. Next the parameter β1 is evaluated 
for statistical significance (different from zero) and sign. 
If β1 is negative and statistically significant, it can be 
inferred that the debt/gdp ratio negatively affects the 
investment (t)/nominal gdp (t-1) ratio. In other words, 
if β1 = 0, Ricardian equivalence is imposed. Equation 
(14) can also be empirically tested with the following 
functional form: It = β0 + β1Yt-1 + β2 *Bt + ut.
Firstly, the aforementioned variables are tested for 
stationarity, and if no whether they co-integrate. Table 
A.1 of the annex shows that neither variable is stationary. 
The Johansen co-integration tests show that there is a 
11  Mendonça, Medrano and Sachsida (2009) analyse the effects of 
fiscal crises on the Brazilian economy between January 1995 and 
December 2007. The results suggest that following an unexpected 
increase in government spending: (i) private consumption rises; 
(ii) gdp decreases (with a probability of 77.1%); and (iii) the interest 
rate rises. This could indicate a crowding-out effect between public 
and private investment.
the economy, the interest rate falls. Every 1% increase 
in the monetary aggregate M1 produces a 0.03% drop 
in the nominal interest rate. 
The results for the second system of equations are 
shown below, based on three equations, and according 
to the data shown in table 7, 8, and 9. The results shown 
in table 7 indicate that all variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In that context, as the null 
hypothesis is rejected but there is a positive deterministic 
trend, fiscal policy is relatively unsustainable, because 
the insolvency problem will eventually arise. The Wald 
test does not accept the null hypotheses that β = 1, with 
a value P < 0,0001. 
The value of the J-statistic at 0.20, with a P value 
of 0.90, does not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
The parameters shown in table 8 are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Every 1% increase in the 
public debt produces a 0.85% increase in the primary 
surplus.
The results shown in table 9 indicate that all variables 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Every 1% 
increase in the primary surplus produces a 0.001% 
increase in the nominal interest rate. This shows that the 
primary surplus has a positive and significant effect on 
the interest rate, suggesting an active fiscal policy and a 
passive monetary policy; in other words, a non-Ricardian 
model. It can also be seen that when the government 
increases liquidity in the economy, the interest rate falls. 
For every 1% increase in the monetary aggregate M1, 
the nominal interest rate drops by 0.006%. 
When analysing the repercussions of an increase 
in the public debt or the primary surplus on the interest 
rate, it is natural also to examine the effect of those fiscal 
variables on the level of investment in the economy. This 
relation is analysed below. 
5. Effect of the public debt on investment
Araujo and Martins (1999) show that long-term 
sustainable growth is possible in a sector overlapping-
generations model. They assume a convex technology, 
no redistribution of income from the previous generation 
to later ones, with income taxation and without the pure 
altruism sustained by Barro (1974). Working with a 
production function of the type Y=AK, and assuming 
that the agent’s utility function incorporates an absolute 
inheritance motive, the authors deduce a clear policy 
repercussion from the model: an increase in government 
debt has a negative effect on the rate of growth of the 
capital stock, such that 
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co-integration equation at the 5% significance level, 
according to the data shown in annex tables A.2 and 
A.3.12 The model presented here used a dummy variable 
(as an exogenous variable in the vector autoregression 
model - var).13 
In the resulting long-term equation, the parameter 
β1 is marginally significant (barely above 5%) as 
shown below:
 It / Yt-1 = -1.621 - 0.220(Bt / Yt-1) (15)
 (0.073) (0.116)
The figures in parentheses represent the standard 
deviations of the respective estimated coefficients. 
According to the long-term equation, for every 1% 
increase in the debt(t)/gdp (t-1) ratio, there is a 0.22% 
reduction in the investment(t)/gdp (t-1) ratio. The negative 
Pearson correlation between the two variables is -27.3% 
at the 5% significance level. Moreover, based on the 
Chi-squared distribution, which shows a value of 1.819, 
the null hypothesis of weak endogeneity (P = 0.177) is 
not rejected; in other words, the debt(t)/gdp nominal 
(t-1) ratio is weakly exogenous.
The public debt does not have a neutral role on the 
real variable of the economy —the ratio of investment 
to gdp. These empirical tests suggest a clear public 
policy prescription: the government should set a target 
for reducing the debt/gdp ratio. This would raise the 
investment/gdp ratio, leading to higher growth, less 
unemployment and, hence, an improvement in the 
population’s living standards. 
— Fiscal sustainability test and effects of the public 
debt on gross fixed capital formation
The results shown in table 10 indicate that all 
variables, except the trend term, are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. In that context, if the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, the discounted debt is not stationary, fiscal 
policy is unsustainable; and, if the situation persists 
indefinitely, it will result in insolvency. The Wald test 
does not reject the null hypothesis that β1 = 1 and 
α1 = 0, with the Chi-squared distribution equal to 4.0573 
and a P value of 0.1315 
12  Based on the sc (Schwarz information criterion) and lr (Likelihood 
information criterion), one lag was chosen.
13  In terms of the specification of the cointegration test, the most 
usual model was used which is best adapted to the data, namely, the 
model that includes the intercept in the cointegration equation and 
in the var, which does not include the trend. This model was used in 
long-term equations 6, 10, and 15. 
The value of the J-statistic at 0.274, with a P value 
of 0.90, does not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
TABLE 10
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(Bt = α0 + α1trend + βBt-1 + α2dummy + εt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.3812 0.1837 2.0750 0.0408
Trend 0.0016 0.0010 1.5888 0.1156
Real debt (-1) 0.9549 0.0246 38.8315 <0.0001
Dummy 0.0378 0.0099 3.8098 0.0003
R2 0.9968 Adjusted R2 0.9966
Source: prepared by the author.




P value: Probability 
TABLE 11
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(It = β0 + β1Yt-1 + β2Bt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant -3.1073 0.1800 -17.2566 <0.0001
Real gdp (-1) 1.4357 0.0515 27.8792 <0.0001
Real debt -0.2557 0.0301 -8.4955 <0.0001
R2 0.9781  Adjusted R2 0.9772
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), I(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), R(-2,-3,-4, 
-5,-6), constant.
gdp: Gross domestic product
P value: Probability 
The results shown in table 11 indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
every 1% increase in real debt there is a 0.256% reduction 
in gross fixed capital formation. This shows that the debt 
has a negative and significant effect on investment, which 
suggests an active fiscal policy. There is also a positive 
effect on investment of lagged real gdp. 
Given the negative effect of the public debt on the 
level of investment, it is natural to test its repercussions 
on output. The next subsection verifies the effect of the 
primary surplus and the public debt on the output gap.
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6. Effects of the primary surplus and public 
debt on the output gap
This subsection estimates the equations of the fiscal IS 
curve and the relation between the primary surplus and 
the public debt. Estimation of the equation that measures 
the response of the primary surplus as a proportion of 
gdp (SP/Y), to the levels of the public debt/gdp ratio 
(B/Y), can be defined as 
 (SP / Y)t = a0 + a1(SP / Y)t-1+ a2(B / Y)t-1 + ut (16)
where ut is the stochastic term.
The fiscal IS curve can be defined as
 yt = a3 + a4yt-1 + a5rt-1 + a6(SP / Y)t-1+ a7et-1 + ηt (17)
where yt is the output gap, rt is the real interest 
rate, (SP/Y)t is the fiscal variable interest (primary 
surplus/gdp), et is the real exchange rate and ηt+1 is 
the stochastic term. The name “fiscal IS” reflects the 
fact that the IS curve includes a fiscal variable. It is 
possible for the stochastic terms of equations (16) 
and (17) not to be serially correlated. 
This model can be used to verify the direct effects 
of the public debt on the primary surplus and the indirect 
effect of that variable (public debt) on the output gap. 
If the public debt/gdp ratio is statistically significant in 
equation (16), and the ratio between the primary surplus 
and gdp is also statistically significant in equation (17), 
then fiscal policy is active. This means that government 
debt indirectly affects a real variable, the output gap, 
through the primary surplus. 
The results shown in table 12 indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
and that for every 1% increase in the debt/gdp ratio, 
the primary surplus/gdp ratio increases by 0.023%. 
These results are consistent with those of equation (10) 
in terms of the significance and signs of the estimated 
coefficients. Equation (16) differs from equation (10), 
because it has the lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable, in this case the primary surplus/
gdp ratio, in t-1. 
The value of the J-statistic at 0.28, with a P value 
of 0.50, does not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
The results shown in table 13 also indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. A 
1% increase in the primary surplus/gdp ratio is associated 
with a 2.963% reduction in the output gap, such that the 
final effect of the 1% increase in the debt/gdp ratio will 
be a reduction of 0.07% in the short-term output gap. In 
the long term, bearing in mind the autoregressive effect 
of the coefficient of the lagged output gap, the final effect 
will be a reduction in the output gap of 0.31%. This result 
empirically proves that fiscal policy is active. 
The other coefficients have the expected signs, 
such that for every 1% increase in the real interest rate 
there is a 0.048% reduction in the output; and for every 
1% increase in the real exchange rate, the output gap 
grows by 0.006%.
Although the primary surplus responds to variations 
in the public debt, which could reflect government concern 
for the budget constraint, nothing guarantees that this 
reaction is strong enough to make the debt solvent. If the 
magnitude of the reaction is appropriate, fiscal policy 
would be passive; in other words, there would be no 
effect on real variables, including the output gap. 
TABLE 12
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
((SP / Y)t = a0 + a1(SP / Y)t-1+ a2(B / Y)t-1 + ut)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.004 <0.001 18.045 <0.001
(SP/Y) (-1) 0.221 0.026 8.411 <0.001
[B/Y](-1) 0.023 <0.001 27.670 <0.001
R2 0.612 Adjusted R2 0.595
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments y(-3,-4,-5,-6), r(-3,-4,-5,-6), SP/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), 
e(-3,-4,-5,-6), B/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), c.
SP: Primary surplus
P value: Probability 
TABLE 13
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth
(yt = a3 + a4yt-1 + a5rt-1 + a6(SP / Y)t-1+ a7et-1 + ηt)





Constant 0.431 0.029 15.047 <0.001
Gap (-1) 0.771 0.013 59.371 <0.001
Interest -r(-1) -0.048 0.009 -5.316 <0.001
[SP/Y](-1) -2.963 0.250 -11.836 <0.001
Exchange rate -r(-1) 0.006 0.003 2.091 0.039
R2 0.722 Adjusted R2 0.696
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments y(-3,-4,-5,-6), r(-3,-4,-5,-6), SP/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), 
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To ensure the robustness of the results, an alternative 
method was used to measure the output gap. In keeping 
with the work of Cusinato, Minella and Junior (2010) 
on measures of the output gap in Brazil, it was decided 
to use the method of extraction of quadratic trend, 
which is a natural extension of the linear trend, adding 
a quadratic term, such that yt = α + β1t + β2t2 + et, 
where t = 1, 2, ...., T. the results obtained are similar to 
those shown in tables 12 and 13, which use an output 
gap based on the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. 
To validate the empirical tests presented above, 
one further test was undertaken using the Leeper (1991) 
model, as described below. 
7. Fiscal dominance: Empirical tests based on 
the Leeper model
The model formulated by Leeper in 1991 defined 
conditions under which monetary and fiscal policies 
can be classified as passive or active, where B is the 
nominal government debt on which a nominal interest 
rate (Rt) is paid, τ represents direct taxes as the overall 
sum (positive) and transfer (if negative), and p is the 
price level. This gives πt = pt / pt-1 and bt = Bt / pt.
The author describes government policies on the basis 
of simple rules, in which fiscal policy is given by
 τt = γ0 + γ bt-1 + Ψt (18)
where Ψt is the exogenous crisis occurring at the start 
of t, such that 
 Ψt = ρΨΨt-1 + εΨt (19)
with ρΨ  < 1 and Et ε Ψt+1 = 0. Monetary policy also 
obeys a simple interest-rate rule as described by Taylor 
(1993), such that 
 Rt = α0 + απt + θt (20)
where θt is an exogenous crisis, occurring at the start 
of t, such that
 θt = ρ0 θt-1 + εθ t (21)
with  ρ0  < 1 and Et ε θt+1 = 0.
In solving the model, Leeper shows how equilibrium 
depends on the parameters (α,γ). The author shows that 
this non-linear model cannot be resolved analytically, 
and reduces it to a dynamic system, in (πt, bt) to find two 
roots: αβ and β -1 – γ, where β is the time preference 
rate. In this context, the author shows that one of the 
roots must be greater than 1 and the other less than 
1 in absolute terms. Consequently, four regions are 
generated, as follows:
Region I: α β ≥ 1 and β γ < 1
−1
−
 Unique equilibrium. Ricardian equivalence 
is maintained in this region. In this case, 
monetary policy is active and fiscal policy 
passive. This is the ideal region for an 
economy to implement a system of inflation 
targeting by controlling the interest rate. 
Region II:  α β < 1 and β γ ≥ 1
−1
−
 Unique equilibrium. This region describes 
the fiscal theory of the price level or the 
situation known as fiscal dominance, in 
which fiscal policy is active and monetary 
policy is passive. 
Region III: α β < 1 and β γ < 1
−1
−
 In this region, the fiscal and monetary 
authorities act passively, subject to the 
budget constraint, so equilibrium is 
indeterminate. 
Region IV: α β ≥ 1 and β γ ≥ 1
−1
−
 There is no equilibrium unless the exogenous 
crises, εΨt  and εθt, are perfectly correlated. 
In this case, monetary and fiscal policies 
are both active. 
These results have important consequences for 
the optimal economic policy prescription. The optimal 
monetary policy rules that predominate in the literature, 
ranging from papers by Taylor to the more recent work 
by Woodford, explicitly or implicitly admit that the 
economy operates in region I. In this context, optimal 
rules are used in which the interest rate responds to 
variations in the output gap and inflation rate and, in the 
case of open economies, the interest-rate also responds 
to fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
Also in the context of region I, optimal monetary 
rules are generally derived from the IS curve and the 
Phillips curve. More recently, most of these models 
start from a microeconomic foundations framework. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of the mode of derivation, the 
vast majority of the models in the international literature 
have something in common. The central bank’s rule 
for setting the interest rate to keep inflation close to its 
target does not refer to fiscal variables. In other words, 
the interest rate does not respond to fiscal variables, 
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whether taxes, primary deficit, or public deficit. As noted 
above, fiscal policy is passive because this is a Ricardian 
model. In this context, the debt and fiscal policy have no 
influence on the price level nor, therefore, on the inflation 
rate. For that reason, the use of a fiscal IS curve and the 
formulation of an interest-rate rule that responds to fiscal 
variables, makes no sense in an active monetary-policy 
and passive fiscal-policy environment.14 
Moreover, taking account of the fact that a given 
economy operates in region II, in which the fiscal theory 
of the price level (ftpl) predominates, the application 
of an optimal monetary policy rule by controlling the 
interest rate, in the traditional way following Taylor, is 
questionable. It possibly makes more sense to use an 
optimal rule such as that proposed by Morais and Andrade 
(2004), which assumes the monetary authority pursues 
a flexible inflation targeting regime, which includes 
the possibility of a target for the debt/gdp ratio. In the 
proposed model, the public debt directly affects the risk 
premium and, consequently, the exchange rate. The 
authors include a target for the debt/gdp ratio based on 
the loss of monetary authority. 
Common sense suggests that if the economy is in 
regions II, III, or IV, fiscal and monetary policies will 
need to be coordinated to be able to migrate to region 
I. Accordingly, the effect of the public debt on real and 
nominal variables of the economy cannot be neglected. It 
is therefore necessary to work with targets for reducing 
the debt/gdp ratio in a clear and transparent fashion. 
Estimations are presented below for the coefficients 
γ and α in equations (18) and (20), where γ represents the 
reaction of direct taxes to variations in the public debt, 
and α, which is derived from a simplified Taylor rule, 
represents the response of the interest rate to variations in 
inflation. The coefficient γ is determined by estimating two 
equations as a system through the generalized method of 
moments, as shown in tables 14 and 15. The coefficient 
α is also determined by an estimation of two equations 
as shown in table 16 and 17. As the Taylor rule used in 
the Leeper model is very simplified, a more common 
rule was used, in which the interest rate responds to 
expected inflation and the output gap. 
The results shown in table 14 indicate that all 
variables, except the constant term, are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In this context, as the null 
hypothesis is rejected but there is a positive deterministic 
trend, fiscal policy is relatively unsustainable, because 
the problem of insolvency will eventually arise. 
14  The term fiscal IS is used by Verdini (2003) as a result of the inclusion 
of a fiscal variable in the IS, in this case the primary surplus. 
TABLE 14
Estimation using the generalized method of 
moments with the Bartlett kernel, Andrews 
bandwidth
((B /Y)t = a0 + a1Trend + a2(B /Y)t-1 + a4*Dummy + ut)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.001 0.021 0.057 0.955
Trend 0.001 <0.001 2.064 0.042
(B/Y)(-1) 0.717 0.043 16.847 <0.001
Dummy 0.146 0.031 4.636 <0.001
R2 0.968 Adjusted R2 0.966
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: instruments B/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), I.D.(-3,-4,-5,-6), c.
Trend: Tendency
Dummy: Dummy variable
P value: Probability 
TABLE 15
Estimation using the generalized method of 
moments with the Bartlett kernel, Andrews 
bandwidth
(ID / Yt = a3 + a4*(B /Y)t-1 + ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.006 <0.001 27.282 <0.001
(B/Y)(-1) 0.005 <0.001 10.035 <0.001
R2 0.386 Adjusted R2 0.373
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments B/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), ID/Y(-3,-4,-5,-6), c.
P value: Probability 
TABLE 16
Estimation using the generalized method 
of moments with the Bartlett kernel, fixed 
bandwidth 
(yt = a1 + a2  yt-1 + a3rt-1 + a4et-1 + a5*Dummy + ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant 0.8555 0.096 8.947 <0.001
Output gap 0.331 0.077 4.312 <0.001
Interest-r -0.236 0.031 -7.612 <0.001
Exchange rate-r 0.111 0.028 3.971 <0.001
Dummy 0.274 0.036 7.659  <0.001
R2 0.505 Adjusted R2 0.460
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), ipca(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), B/Y(-2, 
-3,-4,-5,-6), c.
Dummy: Dummy variable
P value: Probability 
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β = 0.98, a unique equilibrium is attained in region 
II, such that α β < 1 and β γ ≥ 1−1− . It should 
be noted that α β = < 10.149*0.98  and that 
β γ− − =1 1 / 0.98 – 0.005  > 1. The same value of 
β = 0.98 was used estimated by Lima and Issler (2003) 
and followed by Moreira, Souza and Almeida (2007a 
and 2007b). These results indicate that the economy is 
in region II. 
Although the output gap is included in equation 
20, following Moreira, Souza and Almeida (2007b), the 
Taylor rule was also tested without the gap, as per the 
Leeper (1991) model. In this case the result is maintained, 
in other words, the economy remains in region II.15 To 
guarantee the robustness of the results, an alternative 
measure for measuring the output gap was also used. 
Following the work of Cusinato, Minella and Júnior 
(2010) on measures of the output gap in Brazil, it was 
decided to use the quadratic trend extraction method. 
The results obtained are similar to those shown in tables 
16 and 17, which use the output gap estimated with the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Once again, the economy is in 
region II. 
The results also are maintained with respect to the 
monthly series of the Institute of Applied Economic 
Research (ipea) for the period from July 2001 to 
December 2009. The real interest rate was calculated 
as the difference between the cumulative selic rate for 
the next 12 months (annual percentage) and the average 
inflation expectation, according to the Extended National 
Consumer Price Index. (ipca) —cumulative rate for the 
next 12 months (annual percentage). The output gap 
was calculated on the basis of the (general) industrial 
production index using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The 
same monthly variables were used as in the models in 
tables 14 and 15, and 16 and 17. The estimations gave 
the same result, namely that in the flexible exchange rate 
and inflation-targeting period, the economy is operating 
in region II. 
15  Based on the Leeper (1991) model, Moreira, Souza and Almeida 
(2007a) show that fiscal and monetary policies are both passive in 
the period 1999-2004. Almeida, Moreira and Souza (2008) show that 
the fiscal deficit affects the inflation rate indirectly through the output 
gap, based on the stimation of an IS curve and the Phillips curve for 
the period January 1996 to January 2007.
TABLE 17
Estimation using the generalized method of 
moments with the Bartlett kernel, Andrews 
bandwidth
(Rt = a6 + a7*Et(πt+1) + a8*yt + a9*Rt-1 + ηt)
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation
Student 
t-Statistic P value
Constant -0.315 0.054 -5.835 <0.001
Et(πt+1) 0.149 0.038 3.940 <0.001
Output gap 0.177 0.033 5.398 <0.001
selic (-1) 0.872 0.026 34.070 <0.001
R2 0.789 Adjusted R2 0.775
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: Instruments R(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), ipca(-2,-3,-4,-5,-6), B/Y(-2, 
-3,-4,-5,-6), c.
selic: Special settlement and custody system rate
Et(πt+1) = inflation expectations in period t for the period t+1.
P value: Probability
The value of the J-statistic at 0.20, with a P value 
of 0.97, does not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
The results shown in table 15 indicate that all 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
For every 1% increase in the debt/gdp ratio, there is 
a 0.005% increase in the ratio of direct taxes to gdp. 
That value represents the coefficient γ in the Leeper 
(1991) model, which shows the reaction of direct taxes 
to variations in the public debt. 
The results shown in table 16 correspond to the 
estimation of an IS curve in which all variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. All coefficients 
have the expected sign.
The value of the J-statistic at 0.25, with a P value 
of 0.90, does not provide evidence to reject the model 
specification. 
The results shown in table 17 represent the estimation 
of the Taylor rule in which all variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. All coefficients have the 
expected sign. It is assumed that Et(πt+1) = πt+1. For every 
1% increase in the expected value of inflation, the selic 
rises by 0.149%. That value represents the coefficient 
α of the Leeper (1991) model, which shows how the 
interest rate responds to to variations in inflation. 
Based the foregoing results, where the coefficient 
α = 0.149 (see table 17), and the coefficient 
γ = 0.005 (see table 15), and bearing in mind that 
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The results presented in subsection 7, based on the Leeper 
model, show that the Brazilian economy is in a situation 
of fiscal dominance. This is consistent with the results 
reported in the earlier subsections. It should be noted that 
all the fiscal sustainability tests based on Buiter and Patel 
(1992) showed that Brazil’s fiscal situation in the period 
analysed is worrying to say the least. The fiscal policy 
transmission channels can be defined schematically, as 
shown in tables 18 and 19. 
Table 18 shows fiscal policy transmission mechanisms 
that operate through the money supply. It shows the 
effects of variations in the public debt on the primary 
surplus, monetary base, interest rate, investment, and 
the output gap.
The results described in section III show that the 
primary surplus reacts positively to variations in the 
public debt. Nonetheless, the fact that the coefficient of 
the debt/gdp ratio is positive and statistically significant 
does not mean it is large enough to guarantee fiscal 
sustainability. In that case, according to Leeper (1991), the 
fiscal authority refuses to make a substantial adjustment 
in direct taxation, thus preventing the repercussion on 
the deficit from being fully financed by future taxes. As 
noted above, the federal government’s primary surplus is 
recorded in the National Treasury single account, which 
forms part of the central bank’s non-monetary liabilities. 
As the variation in the monetary base corresponds to 
the difference between the variation in central bank 
assets and the variation in its non-monetary liability, if 
there is an increase in the primary surplus (and hence 
in the National Treasury single account recorded in 
the nonmonetary liability), with everything else held 
constant, there will be a reduction in the monetary base. 
In that context, successive increases in the primary 
surplus will lead to a contraction in the monetary 
base, ceteris paribus, and consequently a reduction in 
means of payment. This institutional structure shows 
the existence of a direct channel for transmitting fiscal 
policy to monetary policy. 
As increases in the primary surplus are known 
to cause a reduction in the monetary base, once again 
ceteris paribus, the interest rate is likely to rise. The 
results show that the public debt has a positive effect on 
the nominal selic interest rate, and that increases in the 
public debt cause increases in the primary surplus, which 




Transmission of monetary policy through the money supply
↑ (B / Y) ⇒↑ (SP / Y) ⇒↑ (Single Treasury Account) ⇒↑ (Nonmonetary liability) ⇒
↓ (Monetary base) ⇒↓ (M) ⇒↑ R ⇒↓ (I) ⇒↓ (y) ↑ (B
_
 / Y) ⇒↑ (SP / Y)
.....vicious circle
Source: prepared by the author.
SP: Primary surplus.
TABLE 19
Transmission of fiscal policy through the demand for money
↑ (B / Y) ⇒↑ (demand for money) ⇒↑ R ⇒↓ (I) ⇒↓ (y) ↑ (B
_
 / Y) ⇒
(demand for money) vicious circle
Source: prepared by the author.
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nominal interest rates are accompanied by a higher real 
interest rates, then increases in the public debt can also be 
expected to cause lower levels of investment and output. 
The estimations confirm this negative relation between 
public debt and levels of investment and the output gap. 
Having said that, lower levels of output, for a given debt 
level, result in a higher debt/gdp ratio. This feedback 
process can generate an undesirable vicious circle. 
Similarly to table 18, table 19 shows how fiscal 
policy is propagated from variations in the debt/gdp 
ratio, although in this case through the demand for 
money. The results show that increases in the debt/gdp 
ratio increase the demand for money, which means 
economic agents consider part of the public debt as net 
wealth, and, consequently, the model is non-Ricardian. 
A higher demand for money, given the supply of money, 
suggests a rise in the interest rate. 
The results also suggest that increases in the debt/gdp 
ratio push up the interest rate. The empirical tests show 
that an interest-rate hike causes reductions in the level 
of investment and the output gap (see table 19), which 














L(m) -2.927 -1.701 0.424 -2.921 -2.196 0.210
L(R) -2.919 -2.506 0.120 -2.919 -2.506 0.120
L(b) -3.502 -2.145 0.509 -3.495 -2.518 0.319
L(I/Y-1) -2.924 -0.723 0.831 -2.924 -0.723 0.831
L(B/Y-1) -1.949 -0.916 0.314 -1.947 -0.506 0.821
L(SP/Y) -2.919 -0.929 0.771 -2.919 -0.929 0.771
Source: prepared by the author.
adf: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
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TABLE A.2
Johansen co-integration test:






value 5% P value
Nonea 0.333 29.388 20.262 0.002
At least 1 0.157 8.726 9.164 0.060
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: the trace test indicates a co-integration equation at the 5% 
level.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability.
TABLE A.3
Johansen co-integration test: 









value 5% P value
Nonea 0.333 20.662 15.892 0.008
At least 1 0.157 8.726 9.164 0.060
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: The maximum eigenvalue test indicates a co-integration 
equation at the 5% level. 
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability.
TABLE A 4
Johansen co-integration test: 






value 5% P value
Nonea 0.421 39.705 35.193 0.015
At least 1 0.207 12.347 20.262 0.418
At least 2 0.014 0.726 9.164 0.981
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: The trace test indicates a co-integration equation at the 5% 
level.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability. 
TABLE A.5
Johansen co-integration test: 









value 5% P value
Nonea 0.421 27.358 22.299 0.009
At least 1 0.207 11.622 15.892 0.209
At least 2 0.014 0.726 9.164 0.981
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: The maximum eigenvalue test indicates a co-integration 
equation at the 5% level.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability.
TABLE A.6
Johansen co-integration test: 




Eigenvalue Trace test Critical value 5% P value
Nonea 0.532 47.908 20.262 <0.001
At least 1 0.150 8.434 9.164 0.070
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: The trace test indicates one co-integration equation at the 
5% level. 
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability. 
TABLE A.7
Johansen co-integration test: 









value 5% P value
Nonea 0.532 39.474 15.892 <0.001
At least 1 0.150 8.435 9.164 0.070
Source: prepared by the author.
Note: The maximum eigenvalue test indicates a co-integration 
equation at the 5% level.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
P value: Probability. 
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TABLE A.8
Description of variables
Variables Unit of measurement Source
Means of payment - end period (M) Millions of reais ipea
gdp- market prices (Y) Millions of reais ipea
Interest rate - over/selic (R) Percentages ipea
Gross fixed capital formation - (I) Millions of reais ipea
Implicit gdp deflator (P) Index number ipea
Nominal exchange rate - reais/dollar-commercial -buying - average (E) Percentages ipea
Real effective exchange rate - inpc - exports (e) Percentages ipea
Primary surplus (nfps) -Federal government and central bank -primary - with  
exchange-rate devaluation (SP)
Millions of reais ipea
Inflation rate - ipca (π) Percentages ipea
Direct taxes = individual and corporate income taxes+ rural property tax (id) Millions of reais ipea
Public debt, federal public bonds and open market operations (B) Millions of reais bacen
Average inflation expectations - ipca - cumulative rate for the next 12 months Et(πt+1) Percentages ipea
Industrial production - general industry Quantum - seasonally adjusted index 
(average 2002 = 100)
ipea
Source: prepared by the author.
gdp: Gross domestic product
id: Direct taxes
ipea: Institute of Applied Economic Research 
bacen: Central Bank of Brazil
ipca: Extended National Consumer Price Index 
inpc: National Consumer Price Index
nfsp: Public sector financing needs 
Quantum: Quantity index 
over/selic rate: Daily indicator of the interest rate, corresponding to the average adjusted daily rate of financing of federal government 
bonds, calculated in the Special Settlement and Custody System (selic) and published by the Central Bank of Brazil. This is the basic 
interest rate in Brazil. 
(Original: Portuguese)
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